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aggravating factor. For instance, the Fourth Circuit's inability to
describe Virginia's narrowing approach beyond stating that it requires
"something other than those factors ... present in an ordinary murder"
can be seen as continuing to defy the Godfrey prescriptions against
arbitrariness. If opinions such as Godfrey, Stringer and Shell mean
anything, they mean courts must ensure that aggravating factors give
specific guidance or explanations. Also, while it is true that the Virginia
Supreme Court has defined two of the three factors for vileness-
aggravated battery and depravity of mind (torture has not been de-
fined)-the United States Supreme Court has yet to consider the Smith
constructions approved by the Fourth Circuit in Jones.
24
The Fourth Circuit's decision also addressed the question of whether
an appellate court may find an aggravating factor that was not unani-
mously found by the jury. For example, in Jones it is impossible to know
if thejury ever unanimously found "depravity of mind" vileness, "aggra-
vated battery" vileness, or split on which type of vileness applied. The
Fourth Circuit found it did not matter since the Supreme Court has held
that a jury is not essential to capital sentencing. 25 The crucial issue,
however, is whether where a jury is used by the state's sentencing
scheme, may an appellate court find an aggravating factor which the jury
did not unanimously find (or, as in Jones, use a factor for which it is
impossible to tell). Thus, while the Supreme Court has held appellate
courts may throw out invalid aggravating factors and reweigh the
remainder, it is not so clear, as the Fourth Circuit assumed, that a state
appellate court can find aggravating factors in the first instance. The
23 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
24 Id. See also Shell, 111 S. Ct. 313 (1990), where the modified
dictionary definitions were found insufficient to pass constitutional
muster. See case summary of Shell, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No.
2, p. 3 (1991).
2 5 Jones, 976 F.2d at 175 (citing Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S.
738 (1990) (rejecting the argument that ajury need impose the sentence
of death or make findings to that end) and Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S.
639 (1990) (rejecting the necessity of a jury deciding aggravating and
mitigating factors)0.
26 See Powley, Perfecting the Record of a Capital Case in Virginia,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 26 (1990), and see also case
summaries of Shell, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 2, p. 3 (1991),
issue appears ripe, therefore, for further litigation.
On a more practical note, a useful tool for preserving challenges
to the Virginia vileness factor is a pre-trial motion for a bill of
particulars, in which counsel can request that the court direct the
Commonwealth to specify the factors upon which it intends to rely in
seeking the death penalty. If the vileness factor arises, counsel should
request that the Commonwealth identify every narrowing construction
upon which it will rely. Should the Commonwealth fail to provide
such constructions, counsel can preserve the Godfrey "unconstitution-
ally vague" issue by filing a brief to that point. Should the Common-
wealth respond with Smith, counsel may want to challenge Smith,
using Shell to argue that the narrowing constructions are themselves
unconstitutionally vague.
26
In summary, the United States Supreme Court has continued to
emphasize the importance of giving meaningful guidance to juries,
guidance that by necessity must come from narrowing constructions of
statutes as vague as Virginia's. 27  While approval of the Smith
narrowing constructions in cases such as Jones might be seen as
discouraging Virginia practitioners from pursuing challenges to speci-
ficity, Stringer and Sochor emphasize the continued importance of




Jones, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 2, p. 5 (1992), Stringer,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 11 (1992) and Sochor, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 1 (1992).
2 7 See case summaries of Stringer, Sochor andEspinosa v. Florida,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 11 (1992); case summary of
Bunch v. Thompson, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 2, p. 3 (1992);
Lago, Litigating the "Vileness" Factor in Virginia, Capital Defense
Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 25 (1991); FalknerThe ConstitutionalDeficien-
cies of Virginia's "Vileness" Aggravating Factor, Capital Defense
Digest, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 19 (1989); Priddy, Comment, Godfrey v.
Georgia: Possible Effects on Virginia's Death Penalty Law, 15 U. Rich.
L. Rev. 951 (1981).
WISE v. WILLIAMS
982 F.2d 142 (4th Cir. 1992)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
On November 8, 1984, Joe Louis Wise was convicted of capital
murder, grand larceny, armed robbery and use of a firearm in the
commission of a felony. At the ensuing penalty hearing the jury found
Wise's conduct "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in
that it involved aggravated battery to the victim, beyond the minimum
necessary to accomplish the act of murder" and sentenced Wise to
death.1
The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed Wise's conviction and sen-
tence on November 27, 1985,2 and on April 7, 1986, the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari. 3 After a hearing, the state circuit court
dismissed Wise's state habeas petition on December 11, 1989. Wise
1 See Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2; § 19.2-264.4(C).
2 Wise v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 322, 337 S.E.2d 715 (1985).
did not file a notice of appeal until more than two months after the
expiration of the thirty-day time limit. Wise then made a change in his
court-appointed counsel and was granted leave to file an appeal. After
the Virginia Supreme Court dismissed the petitioner's motion, he filed
a petition for federal habeas corpus relief under 28 United States Code
Section 2254. The district court granted the Commonwealth of
Virginia's motion to dismiss Wise's petition, holding that Wise's
claims were procedurally barred from consideration because the
Virginia court had based its decision on the "adequate and indepen-
dent" state ground that he did not file his notice of appeal within the
set time limit.
To the Fourth Circuit, Wise challenged this conclusion on four
grounds: that the procedural bar was not adequate because the Virginia
3 Wise v. Virginia, 475 U.S. 1112 (1986).
4 Wise v. Williams, 982 F.2d 142, 146 (4th Cir. 1992).
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Supreme Court does not strictly or regularly enforce the mandatory
time limit for notice of appeal; that the Virginia Supreme Court should
have considered the merits of the appeal and not merely dismissed it
on timeliness grounds; that Wise's counsel's failure to file a timely
notice of appeal constitutes "cause," excusing his procedural default;
and that review of his claims was necessary to correct a fundamental
miscarriage of justice.
HOLDING
The United States Court of Appeals held that: "Wise failed to
show that the procedural default relied upon by the Virginia Supreme
Court was not an adequate and independent state ground, that his
attorneys' error constitutes cause to excuse the default, or that federal
review of his claims is necessary to prevent a fundamental miscarriage
of justice."'4 Thus, the United States Court of Appeals affirmed the
judgment of the district court.5
ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
The Wise decision sends a clear message that procedural default as
interpreted in Coleman v. Thompson6 will be strictly applied. Federal
courts will not search for ways around this Supreme Court holding.
As to Wise's claim that the Virginia Supreme Court does not
regularly or strictly enforce the mandatory time limit for notice of
appeal, the Fourth Circuit stated that "the periodic grant of extensions
on motion.., does not mean that the rule is not strictly and regularly
enforced."'7 Rather, the court noted that the United States Supreme
Court in Coleman had found that Virginia did apply the rule consis-
tently and concluded that "the conscientious consideration of motions
for extension and the granting of such motions may well be evidence
that the rule is very strictly enforced; that is, that the rule's requirement
is absolute, absent express dispensation from the court."'8 The Fourth
Circuit stated that there is simply no evidence that the Virginia
Supreme Court does not consistently enforce its filing requirement,
and the court found that Wise cited no authority to suggest otherwise.9
Wise's second claim, that the Virginia court's dismissal was on
the merits as well as timeliness, was hastily dismissed by the court of
appeals. The court stated that "the Virginia Supreme Court will extend
its time requirement only in those cases in which the petitioner has a
constitutional right to have the appeal heard." 10 Relying on Coleman,
the court of appeals rejected Wise's contention that he had a constitu-
tional right under the Sixth Amendment effective assistance of coun-
sel, noting that "'there is no constitutional right to an attorney in state
post conviction proceedings. Consequently, a petitioner cannot claim
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceed-
ings."' 11 The court here also denied Wise relief on his claim that a
Fourteenth Amendment due process right was created through the
"special relationship" petitioner developed with Virginia by virtue of
5 Id.
6 111 S.Ct. 2546 (1991). In Coleman, the Court held that habeas
corpus petitions are procedurally barred by failure to comply with state
requirements for filing notice.
7 Wise, 982 F.2d at 146.
8 Id. at 143.
9 Id. at 144.
10 Id. (quoting Coleman, I 1l S.Ct. at 2560-61).
11 Id. (quoting Coleman, 111 S.Ct. at 2566).
12 Id. at 145. In rejecting Wise's claim that a Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process right had been created, the court stated that Wise's
claim "'rests on a premise that we are unwilling to accept - that when
a State chooses to offer help to those seeking relief from convictions, the
Federal Constitution dictates the exact form such assistance must as-
sume. On the contrary,... the State has made a valid choice to give
the Commonwealth's appointment of counsel for him. 12
Third, the court of appeals rejected Wise's contention that his
counsel's failure to file timely notice of appeal constituted "cause" to
excuse his procedural default. As stated in response to Wise's second
claim, the court asserted that an attorney's error will only constitute
"cause" if the client was denied the constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel. 13 Reiterating the Coleman holding, the Fourth
Circuit simply stated that Wise had no right to counsel in his state
habeas appeal.
14
Additionally, the Wise court stated that "Wise, like Coleman, was
not deprived by his attorneys of an opportunity to have the merits of
his constitutional claims reviewed." 15 It is at this point in the opinion
that the Wise court may have created a window of opportunity for
defense counsel. The above language seems to suggest that because
Wise was given the opportunity to have his constitutional claims
reviewed by the state habeas trial court, the court was not willing to
grant him a second opportunity for review. However, in a case where
no such review took place at the state level, attorneys should attempt
to distinguish the situation from Wise and Coleman. On habeas, an
attorney in such circumstances should argue that because petitioner
was denied review at the state habeas proceedings, he should be
granted this right at the federal level. The quoted language in Wise
appears to indicate that the court may be more sympathetic to this type
of claim. But it should be noted that, in general, the court's decision
here signals to attorneys that the court plans to adhere strictly to
procedural rules and time limits.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit responded to Wise's claim of a
"fundamental miscarriage of justice" by stating that "this argument is
foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision in Sawyer v. Whitley."
16
The court explained its denial of relief by stating that "Sawyer requires
Wise to show 'by clear and convincing evidence that but for constitu-
tional error, no reasonable juror would find him eligible for the death
penalty under [Virginia] law.'
17
In the case at hand, Wise asserted, as the petitioner did in Sawyer,
that if trial counsel had presented the mitigating evidence of his
abusive and criminal family environment, no juror would have found
him eligible for the death penalty. The Fourth Circuit disagreed. The
court held that, as in Sawyer, "'the psychological evidence [that]
petitioner alleged was kept from the jury due to the ineffective
assistance of counsel does not relate to petitioner's guilt or innocence
of the crime."' 18 The Wise court further stated that the exclusion of
mitigating evidence simply does not warrant application of the "fun-
damental miscarriage of justice" exception.1 9
Whether Sawyer was not the appropriate standard to apply might
be debated. Sawyer can be distinguished from the case at hand in that
Sawyer's claim for the miscarriage ofjustice exception was in a case
where the defendant was on his second federal habeas petition. It may
be possible for attorneys to assert that the Sawyer standard is improper
and too stringent20 when a petitioner is bringing his first federal
prisoners the assistance of counsel without requiring the full panoply of
procedural protections that the Constitution requires be given to defen-
dants who are in a fundamentally different position- at trial and on first
appeal as of right."' (quotingPennslyvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551,559
(1987)).
13 Wise, 982 F.2d at 145.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. (quoting Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S.Ct. 2514 (1992)).
17 Id. (quoting Sawyer, 112 S.Ct at 2523).
18 Id. at 146 (quoting Sawyer, 112 S.Ct at 2523-24).
19 Id.
20 See generally case summary of Sawyer, Capital Defense Digest,
Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 18 (1992).
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habeas claim. Such an argument would have to persuade the court that
where a defendant has never had an opportunity to present a claim of
constitutional error to a federal court, a more expansive view of the
"miscarriage of justice" exception should be adopted.
Summary and analysis by:
Lesley Meredith James
JENKINS v. COMMONWEALTH
244 Va. 445 423 S.E.2d 360 (1992)
Supreme Court of Virginia
FACTS
On October 12, 1990, after Arthur Ray Jenkins III and a companion
had become intoxicated at a restaurant and engaged in a fight with a
restaurant patron, family members took Jenkins and his companion from
the scene to his aunt's home where he had been living, along with his
uncle, Floyd Jenkins, age 69, and Lee H. Brinklow, age 72. After
Brinklow attempted to prevent Arthur Jenkins from entering the house,
an argument ensued, and a grisly series of events commenced. Jenkins
shot Brinklow in the face with a.22 rifle, shothis uncle in the head leaving
him on the floor "gagging," and after a short interval outside with
Brinklow, returned to the house, shot his uncle in the head again, and
then, using a butcher knife, stabbed him repeatedly until his "guts came
out." Though Brinklow pled for mercy, Jenkins shot him in the head.t
He then robbed his two victims of their personal items, stole cash and
other valuables from his aunt's bedroom, and left the premises carrying
his two victim's bodies in the back of Brinklow's truck. Jenkins and his
companion abandoned the truck, and after an attempt to clean up the
murder scene, fled the area. Jenkins was apprehended later near
Abingdon.
Jenkins was charged in a multiple count indictment which included:
the capital murder of more than one person as part of the same transac-
tion,2 two counts of capital murder for the killings of Brinklow and
Jenkins in the commission of robbery, 3 two counts of robbery, and two
counts of illegal use of a firearm.4 At trial Jenkins pled guilty to the illegal
use of a firearm in the commission of Brinklow's murder, and the jury
found Jenkins guilty on the remaining charges, including three charges
of capital murder. Jenkins was sentenced to life imprisonment for each
of the robbery convictions and two years imprisonment for the weapons
charge. At the sentencing phase for the capital offenses, the jury
sentenced Jenkins to death for the two remaining capital charges,5 basing
their decision on both the vileness and future dangerousness aggravating
factors.
6
On appeal to -the Virginia Supreme Court, Jenkins presented a
number of arguments centering around the trial court's failure to properly
take into consideration that Jenkins had been sexually abused as a child.
Jenkins argued that some victims of child abuse suffer from a psychologi-
1 Medical examination of the victims indicated Brinklow had
received four gunshot wounds to the head, and the uncle had received two
gunshot wounds in addition to seven stab wounds to the abdomen which
penetrated the body up to eight inches.
2 See Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(7) (1990).
3 See Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(4) (1990).
4 Jenkins was also charged in the original indictment with the
murder of Brinklow under Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-32, but the prosecutor
cal disorder, "child abuse accommodation syndrome," which, if trig-
gered by the appropriate provocation, followed by a sufficient "heating-
up period," can result in uncontrollable rage. Jenkins alleged that a
suggestive remark made by his uncle caused just such a reaction, and
therefore he should have been charged with manslaughter rather than
capital murder.
In order to support this theory, defense counsel was prepared to
offer the testimony of Dr. Faye Sultan, a North Carolina psychologist,
who had examined Jenkins eight days before trial, and the testimony
of Ronald Mabry, a social worker familiar with Jenkins' case. The trial
court refused to allow Mabry's testimony because the court deemed
his testimony to be part of an improper attempt by defense counsel to
offer a diminished capacity defense in a case where defendant did not
claim to be mentally incompetent. In addition the court held that such
an attempt violated the "Stamper principle," 7 which holds evidence of
the state of mind of the defendant to be irrelevant unless an insanity
defense is mounted. On appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court,
defense counsel argued that in barring Mabry's testimony, the court
was stripping the defendant of the right "to mount a manslaughter
defense."
Unlike Mr. Mabry, Dr. Sultan voluntarily decided not to testify.
Her decision was based on a motion filed by the prosecutor during the
penalty phase, five days into the trial, suggesting that Dr. Sultan could
not properly testify in Virginia because she was not licensed here. The
prosecutor went so far as to allege that should Dr. Sultan testify, she
might be violating Virginia licensing statutes, a criminal violation.
Though the trial court overruled the prosecutor's motion, Dr. Sultan,
after consulting with independent counsel, decided not to risk possible
legal and ethical sanctions by testifying. Defense counsel objected to
the prosecutor's tactic as improper, and suggested that it interfered
with the defendant's constitutional right to present favorable evidence
during the penalty phase of the trial.
Finally, defense counsel alleged that there may have been juror
misconduct. Published accounts after the trial revealed that the foreman
had made a plea for a capital sentence by arguing that if his fellow jurors
failed to impose the death penalty, Jenkins might be released on parole
in as few as ten years. Because this statement is clearly inaccurate, and
subsequently made a motion to nolle prosequi that count.
5 Although the defendant was also convicted of capital murder for
the killing of Floyd Jenkins in the commission of robbery, that charge
was dismissed during the penalty phase upon the Commonwealth's
motion.
6 See Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.2; § 19.2-264.4(C) (1990).
7 See Stamper v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 707, 717, 324 S.E.2d
682, 688 (1985).
